
Draft of Conclusions 9 January 1951



- 1. For the forseeable future, the Chinese Communist regime, unless disloged from power by strong outside forces, will retain exclusive governmental control of mainland China. Although widespread anti-Communist activity exists in mainland China, this activity is not coordinated, adequately supplied, or provided with an adequate political basis. The Chinese Communists are capable of containing and controlling opposition elements under existing circumstances.
- 2. The main immediate objective of the Chinese Communists is the conquest of all of China, including Taiwan, and the eradication of both Western and Kuomentang influence from China. Their general objectives are to construct a Marxist-socialist society in China, to achieve national autonomy, and to advance the wause of a world Communist society. By pursuing their objectives in close association with the USSR and in seeking to eliminate Western influence from Asia, the Chinese Communists are pursuing a course in which each Chinese achievement diminishes the strategic and power position of the US and its allies relative to the position of the USSR and its satellites.
- 3. The Chinese Communists will not have achieved the success of their revolution untilk they have conquered Taiwan, an objective to which they are publicly committed. Considerable Soviet covert military support toward that end is a probability if Chinese Communists and Soviet leaders determined that the Chinese Communists forces alone could not successfully take Taiwan. An amphibious assault on Taiwan might well be attempted during favorable weather this year. Chinese Communist objectives and military power also pose

Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030014-9

a threat to all of mainland Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists have the military capability, if not interdicted by Western counteraction, of effectively intervening in Indochina, Thailand, and Burma.

- vulnerability to economic warfare, naval blockade, sabotage, and aerial bombardment. Curtailment of foreign trade by Western controls or embargos would handicap, but alternation not seriously damage, Chinese economic activity and military potential. An intensive sabotage program and a naval blockade superimposed on trade controls would produce a more produce effect. An effective aerial bombardment program against rail systems, industrial capacity and storage bases, if applied in addition to economic warfare measures, would render a sustained external effort improbable and might eventually neutralize China.
- 5. Ultimately, the achievement of Chinese Communist objectives depends not only upon China's own military and economic capabilities and upon the nature and extent of Western counteraction, but also upon the foundations and evaluation of Communist China's relations with the USSR. All the relevant evidence at the moment indicates that the Chinese Communist Party is acting on the thesis that its present and future, as well as that of world Communism, is bound to the present and future of the USSR. Coordination of policy with the USSR is therefore a policy and fact, though not necessarily an immutable principle.
- 6. The current Soviet program of providing economic and military assistance to Communist China can either enhance or limit the capabilities of the Communist regime to achieve its objectives. At present, that program is enabling China to cope with some of its economic problems and to move toward its objectives. Various factors, such as Soviet willingness and ability to continue the program and the conditions attached by the USSR to continuance of

aid, will determine the value of that program to the Chinese leaders and well affect the ultimate relation between China and the USSR.

- 7. China's ties with the USSR would be strengthened if Western counteraction created conditions which would make China more dependent on the USSR, more convinced of the threat of US policy to Chinese security, and more convinced of the necessity of strengthening its alliance with the USSR. On the other hand, China's dependence upon, need for, and respect for the USSR would be weakened if the USSR failed to carry out its commitments to China, acted with undue rashness in its propensity to interfere in Chinese internal affairs, or attempted to assert leadership of the Asian Communist movements, to subvert the Chinese Communist Party and Army, or to take control of China's sconomic resources. There is no evidence that the USSR has done so or intends at present to do so.
- 8. It presently appears that, unless the USSR itself alienates China,
 China will adhere closely to the partnership, primarily because it is a
 profitable alliance and there is no feasible alternative. Only if the USSR
 became weaker in comparison with the West and concurrently the Chinese
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 Communists had reason to believe that they could retain their autonomy by an